Executive Summary
Efforts to form a new government were thrown into further disarray this week as Muqtada al-Sadr ordered loyal MPs in Parliament to formally resign their positions. Like his pre-election threats to boycott the October polls, Sadr has repeatedly threatened to step out of the political process amidst the enduring frustrations and repeated failures to form a new government.
When calling on his MPs to resign last week, Sadr reiterated that the withdrawals intend to “create conditions” to form a new government, implying that the bloc is sacrificing seats in the national interest.
That said, a more likely and ominous motive proposed by various observers is that Sadr may now be looking to facilitate the formation of a Fatah/State of Law-led government, with a view to then discredit and bring down the government through street action.
Regardless, the Sadrist withdrawal amounts to a tectonic shift that will almost certainly upset existing political alliances, while further delaying efforts to form a new government. The near-term outlook for protest activity in Baghdad and the South is accordingly elevated, as means to exercise pressure.
A related consideration pertains to an uptick in localized militia violence between Sadrists and Fatah-linked elements, and a general increase in protest activity driven by popular frustrations over the government formation crisis.
Sadrist MPs withdraws from parliament
The political crisis deepened this week as Muqtada al-Sadr ordered his MPs to withdraw from parliament, thereby formally excluding the largest political bloc from inclusion in the next government. On 13 June, Jafaar al-Sadr – Muqtada’s cousin and the main Sadrist candidate for the Prime Minister position – also announced that he is withdrawing his candidacy for the position and by reportedly ordering the closure of political offices across the country, Sadr is not hinting at a more general withdrawal from the political process altogether.
Rumors of a Sadrist withdrawal have circulated for some time amidst the continued and seemingly never-ending struggle to form a new government yet were formalized on 12 June when Speaker of Parliament Mohammed al-Halbusi accepted the resignation letters of 73 MPs representing the Sadrist bloc. The Sadrists thereby also announced their departure from the so-called Save the Homeland Alliance – a tripartite alliance that comprised members of the KDP and Sunni Sovereignty Alliance. Since the October 2021 elections, the Save the Homeland Alliance has struggled against the Shia-dominated Coordination Framework – led by Sadr’s main rivals al-Fatah (led by Hadi al-Ameri) and State of Law Coalition (led by Nuri al-Maliki) – to form a “national majority government”, resulting in a protracted deadlocked stalemate without real progress and leaving the current caretaker government of Mustafa al-Kadhimi in place.
Like his pre-election threats to boycott the October polls, Sadr has repeatedly threatened to step out of the political process amidst the enduring frustrations and repeated failures to form a new government. In April, he declared 40 days of self-exclusion from politics, nominally to allow his rivals to negotiate with other members of the Save the Homeland Alliance to form a new government. The initiative predictably failed, as did several subsequent, failed initiatives to break the government deadlock in May. When calling on his MPs to resign last week, Sadr reiterated that the withdrawals intend to “create conditions” to form a new government, implying that the bloc is sacrificing seats in the national interest.
Procedural implications and motives unclear
The immediate constitutional and procedural implications of the resignations remain subject to differing interpretations. Speaking on 13 June, Speaker Mohammed Halbusi said legal procedures would be followed that stipulate MPs who resign will be replaced by candidates who received the second most votes in the latest elections. However, other observers point to constitutional articles that suggest a parliamentary majority is required to vote on resignation, indicating the move may not be final but rather intended to incentivize negotiations and concessions from Sadr’s rivals.
Assuming the resignations do proceed, and the current candidates are replaced, Sadr’s objectives are likewise subject to interpretation. One plausible aim may be re-election, which remains a possibility but one that would require parliament to dissolve itself. With the exclusion of the Sadrists from any future government widely seen – including by his rivals – as a catalyst for further instability, this may well be a preferred option for several factions yet when addressing various scenarios Speaker Halbusi said this has not been raised by either side.
A more likely and ominous motive proposed by various observers is that Sadr may now be looking to facilitate the formation of a Fatah/State of Law-led government, with a view to then discredit and bring down the government through protests and street action. If empty seats are replaced by candidates with the second most votes, the result would be an increase in the number of seats allocated to the Coordination Framework which, although short of a parliamentary majority, would now be better placed to form a government without Sadrist influence.
While formally empowering his rivals may seem paradoxical, this would be consistent with a Sadrist tactic employed over the previous decade of mobilizing and exercising political influence from a position of popular opposition to the sitting government. By adopting the role of a populist kingmaker outside the formal process, Sadr has been able to claim credit for pushing through and overseeing populist reforms (like the latest Sadr-backed Food Security Law) while avoiding popular criticism for any government dysfunction – a tactic that has served Sadr well over the years based on recent election results.
The resignations on 12 June are certainly consistent with this trajectory, yet the near-term developments are understandably difficult to predict amidst the uncertainty. A key indicator will be the reactions and responses of the Coordination Framework which, empowered by additional seats, may attempt to form a new government without Sadrist participation. Or the alliance may opt to call Sadr’s assessed bluff and instead pursue new negotiations or re-election. Initial reactions from the alliance were conflicted and vague, underscoring a degree of uncertainty. On 13 June, the alliance issued a statement saying they “respect” the decision to withdraw while pledging to continue to take the necessary steps to end the political deadlock. Meanwhile, Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazani adopted a less conciliatory tone by accusing some political parties of “attempting to spread chaos” and emphasizing that solutions will not be found by “blocking the streets.”
Elevated outlook for protests and intra-militia violence amidst uncertainty
The near-term developments are understandably characterized by great uncertainty and understandably difficult to predict, with the coming days and weeks expected to witness intense wrangling and back-door negotiations between various stakeholders to proceed forward. Regardless, the Sadrist withdrawal represents a tectonic shift in the political scene that will upset existing political alliances, while further delaying efforts to form a new government. –Meanwhile, with the Sadrist faction potentially reverting to street action and operating outside the political process, the political system as a whole is set to be significantly weakened for the remainder of the current term.
The near-term outlook for protest activity in Baghdad and the South is accordingly elevated, as is the potential for Sadrist show of force parades and deployments as means to exercise pressure. A related consideration pertains to an uptick in localized militia violence between Sadrists and Fatah-linked elements. This includes politically motivated assassinations and more targeted forms of violence affecting political offices and HQs, notably in areas associated with strong Sadrist support and the presence of the Sadrist peace brigades. While current tensions have yet to translate into more overt violence, a scenario involving more indiscriminate, overt violence cannot be discounted over the medium term and remains important to monitor.
More generally, the deepening government formation crisis – and the related institutional failure to address pressing economic and social issues – is assessed to increase the near-term outlook for a more generic uptick in protest activity. Further to the failure to pass a national budget, this includes a lack of government action to address water and electricity shortages, and rising food and energy prices, all set to be exacerbated as summer temperatures rise. Long-standing popular frustrations are by no means unprecedented, but the current political deadlock, combined with seasonal and macro-economic challenges are set to further exacerbate localized grievances across the country.