Executive Summary
This week, Iran submitted a written response to a draft version of the JCPOA, described last week by EU officials as the “final text.” US officials and other signatories of the agreement said they were willing to quickly conclude the agreement based on the terms outlined in the draft, however, the Iranian response submitted on 16 August reportedly contained requests for additional amendments.
While details have not been revealed, various sources claim Iranian demands continue to revolve around lifting the FTO designation of the IRGC, IAEA inspections, and guarantees that the agreement will outlast the current US administration.
The nature of Iranian demands suggests intent to prolong current negotiations and underscores a lack of urgency in Tehran that stands in contrast to the West. Contrary to the EU rhetoric, Iran clearly does not view the latest draft as “final”, indicating negotiations may continue.
Iran submits written response to EU-led draft
On 16 August, Iran sent a written response to a draft version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that was concluded at the negotiations in Vienna on 8 August. To recall, EU representatives referred to the draft as the “final text”, implying that there was little room for additional negotiations. In a statement on Twitter the same day, EU Foreign Policy High Representative Joseph Borrell wrote: “What can be negotiated has been negotiated, and it’s now in a final text.”
US officials and other signatories of the agreement said they were willing to quickly conclude the agreement based on the terms outlined in the draft, however, the Iranian response submitted on 16 August reportedly contained requests for additional amendments. Iranian state-linked sources said three outstanding issues remain, without elaborating, while Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, said the US must show “flexibility” or else the talks would continue.
EU officials confirmed on 17 August that it received Iran’s response and that they are studying the proposal in consultation with other members of the P5+1. US State Department Spokesperson Ned Price likewise confirmed ongoing consultations with EU counterparts regarding the Iranian response, with various reports claiming a counter-response will likely be made by the US and EU before the end of this week.
IRGC designation, IAEA inspections and safeguards
As usual, the content of the Iranian response, and details of the outstanding issues to be addressed, have not been revealed in public amidst political sensitivities on both sides. That said, various reports disseminated by Iranian and international media outlets indicate that Iranian demands continue to revolve around lifting the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and the inclusion of guarantees that future US administrations will not abandon the agreement.
A third demand pertains to inspections and monitoring activities conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a request that the agency concludes its investigation into the discovery of uranium particles at three undeclared nuclear sites. In a press conference, Amirabdollahian said US officials “verbally accepted” two of these demands during the latest negotiations, but that Iran wants the demands to be included in writing. The foreign minister added that Iran is still waiting for a response on a third issue, without elaborating.
As repeatedly discussed over the course of the 16-month-long negotiations, neither of these requests is new. Lifting the IRCG designation, while technically outside the scope of the JCPOA, has been repeatedly described by Iran as a “red line” and a condition for restoring the agreement. Likewise, Iran’s longstanding distrust of the IAEA stems in part from accusations that information about the nuclear program obtained through inspections will be utilized by regional adversaries – including Israel and the US – to sabotage the program. Meanwhile, requests for future safeguards to maintain the agreement understandably stems from Iranian concerns that a new US administration will once again withdraw from the deal, repeating former President Trump’s decision in 2018.
While a level of flexibility may plausibly be granted on the IRGC designation, it is unlikely that the US will or can meet the other two demands. A decision to finalize the investigation into uranium particles can only be taken by the IAEA, and US officials have repeatedly rejected suggestions that the JCPOA negotiations will be used to pressure the agency, whose activities should be conducted in a non-politicized manner. This week, both US Envoy Robert Malley and IAEA Secretary General Raphael Grossi reiterated that the investigation will only be concluded once Iran provides credible answers while reiterating that the IAEA and JCPOA issues are separate.
The Biden administration has likewise ruled out the possibility of providing guarantees that the agreement will last beyond its own term in office due to constitutional limitations. Lacking a two-thirds majority in the Senate, President Biden will – like Obama – most likely have to restore the JCPOA through a presidential decree which may then be similarly reversed by a future predecessor.
Iranian demands suggest lack of urgency
The Iranian demands may seem unrealistic, however given President Biden’s approval ratings and significant congressional opposition to restoring the agreement, Tehran is understandably keen to avoid a repetition of 2018. The requests for additional safeguards and guarantees to avoid what was widely regarded as a national ‘humiliation’ is therefore to be expected at this stage of the negotiations.
At the same time, the unrealistic nature of Iranian demands suggests intent to prolong current negotiations and underscores a lack of urgency in Tehran that stands in contrast to the West. Contrary to the EU rhetoric, Iran clearly does not view the latest draft as “final”. The recent increase in oil prices, combined with the continued exports of Iranian oil and growing ties with Russia and China, has also afforded Iran an economic and political lifeline that has offset perceptions of international isolation, and thus reduced the perceived necessity of concluding an agreement with the West.
Meanwhile, the repeated insistence by western officials since the start of the negotiations that “time is running out” has gradually been eroded and the absence of serious alternatives to the JCPOA means Tehran likely counts on the West to continue negotiations regardless of whether it accepts the latest proposal. In the meantime, the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program affords Tehran incrementally greater leverage, indicating Iran may well look to preserve the current status quo for the foreseeable future.
Status quo and negotiations may continue
Despite assessed concerns about the nuclear program, the current situation may likewise serve the Biden administration over the short term. With mid-term elections set to take place in November, and President Biden’s approval ratings reaching historic lows, the administration may plausibly look to avoid any drastic foreign policy moves that will invite republican attacks and domestic criticism. The recent assassination attempt of author Salman Rushdie and the uncovered IRGC-linked plot to assassinate former National Security Advisor John Bolton have likewise been used as evidence of Iran’s malign activities. In this context, a decision to grant Iran billions of dollars in sanctions relief would understandably be criticized as another “soft” foreign policy decision and while the administration remains committed to the agreement, the timing is certainly not ideal.
Absent a clear “yes” to the Iranian response submitted on 16 August assessed priorities on both sides suggest negotiations may continue over the short to medium term until economic and political conditions prove more opportune.