GCC-Israeli disagreements on Iran show limitations of anti-Iran “axis”

Jul 28, 2022

Executive Summary

Preceding discussions of US-Israeli-led efforts to form a regional axis against Iran fell short of assessed expectations and no significant breakthrough unfolded during US President Joe Biden’s Middle East Visit. Beyond the symbolic opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli aircraft, progress on Saudi-Israeli normalization was likewise limited. Despite widespread agreement on the need to counter the Iranian nuclear program and other activities, the strategic priorities of regional stakeholders continue to differ and the rhetoric employed during the visit illustrates persistent limitations in efforts to promote greater regional cooperation against Iran.

As discussed ahead of the visit, the trip was widely expected to focus on Iran, including assessed US/Israeli-led efforts to promote greater security cooperation between regional stakeholders, including Israel and the Gulf States. This ranged from steps to integrate air defense capabilities and intelligence sharing, to more ambitious efforts to create a regional “security alliance” to counter Iran – all broadly intended to mobilize a comprehensive, collective front to deter and contain Iranian activities in the region.   

A centerpiece of these efforts involves assessed efforts to encourage Israeli-Saudi normalization as a natural extension of the Abraham Accords, with Israeli officials intimating expectations of a possible breakthrough ahead of the visit. Indeed, speaking next to Prime Minister Lapid, President Biden emphasized US commitment to building “a robust regional architecture; to deepen the ties between Israel and all of its regional partners; to advance Israel’s regional integration over time; and to expand the circle of peace to include ever more Arab and Muslim States.” Biden likewise mentioned previously discussed efforts to “integrate air defenses and early warning systems to ensure that we can defeat airborne threats”, however no further details were revealed with regards to purported efforts to coordinate and deepen regional security cooperation. In terms of advancing Israeli-Saudi cooperation, Riyadh reportedly agreed to open its airspace to Israeli commercial flights while Israel approved a draft agreement recognizing Saudi sovereignty over Tiran and Sanafir – two islands located in the Red Sea.

Prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization limited
Beyond these mainly symbolic steps however, the visit did not produce any tangible progress on these matters and may have fallen short of assessed Israeli expectations for a significant breakthrough. Speaking after the visit, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Farhan bin Faisal said there was “no discussion” regarding an “Arab NATO” or “a defensive alliance with Israel.” Bin Farhan also dismissed the possibility of normalization with Tel Aviv unless significant progress is made on the establishment of a two-state solution – essentially reiterating the position repeatedly expressed by Saudi Arabia in recent years.

Moreover, despite widespread agreement on the need to counter the Iranian nuclear program and other activities, the rhetoric employed during the trip illustrates significant differences between Israel, the US, and the Gulf States – differences that underscore divergent interests and the limitations in efforts to promote security cooperation against Tehran. In his meeting with Lapid, Biden stressed that diplomacy is the “best way to achieve this outcome” while the Israeli Prime Minister said “diplomacy” and “words will not stop them” and that the only preventive measure is “to put a credible military threat on the table.” These two positions were somewhat reconciled in the Jerusalem communique, which included a pledge by the US to use “all elements of its national powers to ensure that outcome” – an implicit but clear reference to the potential use of military force as an option should diplomatic efforts fail.

By contrast, the Joint US-GCC statement primarily underscored the importance of “diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon” – a clear statement in support of current efforts to restore the JCPOA and other diplomatic initiatives undertaken by regional stakeholders. Individually, representatives from the GCC countries struck a more conciliatory tone that further underscores a difference in approach compared to Israel. Saudi Foreign Minister Bin Farhad emphasized that their “hand is extended to Iran” and expressed hope that the ongoing Iran-Saudi dialogue will yield positive results. Meanwhile, UAE advisor and former Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash said Abu Dhabi would not take part in a regional axis against Iran, and that the country is planning to send an ambassador to Tehran in the short term. According to Iranian officials, Qatar recently reiterated a proposal for “regional dialogue” with Iran – a concept propagated by Doha in recent years and that appears to gain traction within the GCC in light of recent Qatari efforts to forge a closer dialogue with Iran.

Rhetoric indicative of divergent strategic priorities and interests
These differences reflect divergent perceptions of the Iranian threat which will likely continue to undermine efforts to promote broader cooperation. Unlike Israel, the Gulf States do not view Iran as an existential threat and countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE are more likely to pursue diplomatic initiatives as the first course of action in terms of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. Alongside Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait’s continued opposition to normalization over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, this naturally entails a limitation in terms of furthering a military “alliance” against Iran.  For their part, Iran appears to welcome dialogue with the GCC countries as a countermove to assessed US/Israeli efforts to promote an anti-Iranian axis. Speaking during Biden’s visit, the head of Iran’s Strategic Foreign Relations Council Seyed Kamal Kharrazi, a close advisor to the Supreme Leader, said Iran welcomes the proposal for regional dialogue and Tehran was prepared to initiate talks with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey.  The statement is consistent with previous remarks made by other Iranian officials since the election of President Raisi who has welcomed deeper diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, including the Gulf States, to discuss regional security issues.   

Pending the outcome of the JCPOA negotiations and other regional diplomatic initiatives, including the Iraq-mediated Saudi Iranian dialogue and the Yemen peace process, the visit corroborates the assessment that the Gulf States are likely to maintain a cautious approach and refrain from deepening security cooperation with Israel in a manner that will escalate regional tensions. However, this is not assessed to prevent more tacit forms of cooperation or continued US/Israeli efforts to promote regional engagement efforts to deter and contain Iranian activities – the feasibility and success of which remain highly sensitive to wider geopolitical dynamics and current developments. Short to medium-term indicators worth monitoring include the progress of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, the Iran-Saudi dialogue and efforts to establish a permanent truce in Yemen – developments that are likely to affect GCC approaches moving forward. Likewise, the outcome of these developments sets conditions and will continue to dictate broader Iran-linked responses in the region involving both conventional and proxy capabilities.   

 

 

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