Executive Summary

• Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed president of Syria

• Diverse reactions by domestic and regional actors

• Visits to Saudi Arabia and Turkey highlight regional engagement

• SNA and SDF exchange blame for fatal VBIED attacks

• VBIED attacks set to complicate negotiations over SDF integration

• CENTCOM confirms death of leader of dissolved AQ group

• Speculation over US troop presence continues amidst withdrawal reports

Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed president of Syria

Political developments were dominated this week by the appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa – the leader of Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the de-facto leader of Syrian since the December toppling of President Bashar al-Assad – as the new president of Syria. Al-Sharaa was appointed during a conference organized by the interim government on 29 January in Damascus where the HTS also announced a series of new measures to kickstart the political transition. Most notably, this included the abolition of the People’s Assembly and the formation of a temporary legislative council as well as the abolition of the 2012 constitution. The announcements also included the dissolution of the old Syrian army and affiliated institutions, militias and government bodies that fell under the previous regime.

The next day, Interim President al-Sharaa held a speech to the Syrian people that outlined a series of goals and objectives for his government during the interim phase. These included prosecuting criminals “who have been involved in Syrian blood and committed massacres and crimes against us, whether they hid inside the country or fled outside it” and achieving “civil peace”. The speech also stressed the need to build a strong economy and strong state institutions to provide job opportunities, improve living conditions and restore basic services.

Ahmed al-Sharaa during speech in Damascus on 30 January

The president further reiterated that the government is committed to building “an inclusive transitional government representing Syria’s diversity through its men, women, and youth, tasked with building new Syrian institutions.”  The speech also stressed the need to build a “unified Syria” with a government capable of “imposing its sovereignty under one authority.” Arguably his most significant remark came at the end of the speech when al-Sharaa pledged to build “Syria’s new institutions until we reach a stage of free and fair elections.”

The conference and subsequent speech were greeted with celebrations in Damascus, and within government-controlled areas, while the international reactions were broadly positive (see below). However, the conference and subsequent speech left several issues still unaddressed, especially regarding the timeline for the political transition and the HTS’ long-term intent when it comes to power-sharing. To recall, the term of the current interim government led by Prime Minister Muhammed al-Bashir is set to expire on 1 March and the HTS has pledged to hold a national dialogue conference, involving all sections of Syrian society, to discuss the drafting of a new constitution. No such plans were announced during the conference however and it is currently whether the initial 1 March term expiration will be respected.

Furthermore, Al-Sharaa’s reference to holding elections is a positive indicator and consistent with the HTS’s earlier pledges, yet the wording of his remarks indicates that the government will prioritize stability, order and the rebuilding of institutions before any elections can take place. Indeed, days prior to the speech, al-Sharaa told media outlet al-Arabiya that the elections process could take “four years” while rewriting a new constitution would take “two to three years”. In the same interview, al-Sharaa emphasized that the “infrastructure for elections right now is very flawed. We need to rebuild it” – remarks that echo those made by the president in his 29 January speech.

Diverse reactions by domestic and regional actors

The domestic and regional reactions to the conference and subsequent speech were predictably diverse, the international reactions were broadly positive. As expected, the Gulf States were quick to praise the new measures. Qatar was the first country to congratulate al-Sharaa’s appointment and the following day, Emir al-Thani made his first visit to Damascus in a significant show of support. Other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, also sent congratulatory remarks that welcomed the announcement. Turkey and Jordan likewise praised the appointment and responded with symbolic gestures in return: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan extended an invitation to al-Sharaa for a visit to Turkey while the Jordanian government announced that Jordanian Airlines would schedule four flights a week to increase traffic to Damascus.

The EU also welcomed the speech by al-Sharaa, with spokesperson for Middle East and North Africa Luis Bueno describing the vision outlined by the interim president as “aligned with the aspirations of the Syrian people.” Bueno added that the EU remains committed to enhancing its presence in Syria following recent engagements with the new leadership. Despite this, the EU remains committed to maintaining sanctions for now and will continue to monitor the steps taken by the new government during the political transition. Speaking with an international media outlet this week, High Representative Kaja Kallas clarified that the issue of amending sanctions in the future is certainly a consideration, but that this is “not currently on the agenda.”

Meanwhile, domestic reactions in Syria were more diverse and reflective of existing fault lines. Most notably, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the affiliated Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) released statements criticizing the conference for leaving out segments of the Syrian population and refuting the legitimacy of al-Sharaa as president. DAANES emphasized that the appointment of the president should have been made during a national conference that included all political components of Syria. For his part, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi informed international media outlets that the SDF was not invited to the conference and would therefore not comment on its outcome. In the same interviews, Abdi said however that discussions and negotiations with the HTS-led government are currently ongoing.

Visits to Saudi Arabia and Turkey highlight regional engagement

Days after his speech, President al-Sharaa embarked on his first foreign visit as President when he arrived in Saudi Arabia on 2 February to meet with Crown Prince Muhammed Bin Salman and other senior Saudi officials. Describing the subsequent meetings in positive terms yet devoid of meaningful detail, the official readouts said the two sides discussed ways Saudi Arabia may support the “security and stability of sisterly Syria”, and how to “raise the level of communication and cooperation in all areas, especially humanitarian and economic.” In a subsequent, written statement, al-Sharaa said the two also discussed “extensive future plans in the fields of energy, technology, education and health”. The next day, the Turkish presidency announced that President al-Sharaa would visit Turkey, at the invitation of President Erdogan, with the meeting scheduled to take place on 4 February.

President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Crown Prince Muhammed Bin Salman in Riyadh

As previously discussed, the visit to Saudi Arabia further underscores Riyadh’s intent to engage closely with the new government and to consolidate political influence through diplomatic support, humanitarian aid and economic support. In this sense, Saudi Arabia appears to replicate and match parallel efforts by Qatar which remains arguably the most ardent supporter of the new government and which, unlike Saudi Arabia, never normalized relations with the Assad government.

The interim government’s close ties with Turkey also set conditions for closer Saudi-Turkey collaboration in Syria, and al-Sharaa’s visit to Ankara directly following his Riyadh trip underscores this trajectory. Given Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s previous strategic rivalry – based, amongst other considerations, on radically opposing views on the Muslim Brotherhood and competing visions for the region – some observers have speculated that present developments may precipitate competition between the two however so far the approach by both sides appears collaborative and mutually supporting. Besides opposing Western sanctions, both Ankara and Riyadh have also strongly denounced Israel’s incursion into southern Syria and appear committed to supporting a stable Syria while keen to exclude Iranian influence which both sides regard as a source of instability. While a degree of competition cannot be discounted, present developments suggests that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar will likely collaborate closely to support the government over the coming months.

SNA and SDF exchange blame for fatal VBIED attacks

Security conditions in the Northern and Eastern provinces, including in Aleppo and Hasaka provinces, remain highly volatile and shaped by the continuing conflict between the SDF and Turkish-backed forces. Dominating headlines this week were several attacks involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs or car bombs) that detonated in Manbij and which, unlike previous attacks, claimed a large number of casualties. On 1 February, at least three people were killed and six others injured when a vehicle detonated at the Safina Roundabout in Manbij city. Among the victims were several members of the SNA as well as civilian bystanders. The next day, members of the SNA reportedly interdicted a VBIED heading towards Aleppo city, with separate sources stating the vehicle originated from the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Manbij.

A more significant attack occurred on 3 February, when another VBIED detonated close to a gas station in the southern outskirts of Manbij. The detonation occurred when a lorry carrying female agricultural workers passed by, with at least 19 civilians killed and dozens of others wounded. The attack was the deadliest terrorist attack in Syria since the fall of the Assad government and stands out due to the high number of fatalities, with the majority of previous VBIEDs in Aleppo province resulting in no or very few casualties.

VBIED attacks in Manbij city: 4 January – 4 February 2025

The VBIEDs this week bring the total number of attacks recorded over the past month (since 4 January) to seven in total, with the majority (five) reported in the Manbij district and following the expulsion of the SDF from the area. So far, no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks yet both the SNA and SDF blame each other for the incidents as part of purported efforts to destabilize the area. The SNA and Turkey have understandably blamed YPG/PKK elements within the SDF for conducting the attacks as part of a campaign of retaliation and in an attempt to unsettle SNA control over towns and roadways in the province. Meanwhile, SDF-linked sources and officials have blamed the SNA with an SDF spokesperson claiming the most recent attack on 3 February is suggestive of tactics employed by Turkish-backed groups. Other SDF-linked sources claim the attacks are orchestrated as part of a deliberate effort by the SNA to delegitimize the PKK/YPG, and by extension the SDF, to justify Turkey’s operations in northern Syria. For their part, the SDF has strongly denied any involvement and condemned the attacks as acts of terrorism that intend to undermine stability.

VBIED attacks set to complicate negotiations over SDF integration

Attribution for the attacks is set to remain unclear and subject to conflicting and politicized accounts, however it should be noted that the rise in attacks correlate with the SDF’s loss of Manbij district and that allegations of SNA involvement are undermined by casualties suffered within SNA ranks as a result of the attacks. Regardless, further attacks can be expected in Manbij and within SNA-controlled areas of Aleppo, and in addition to destabilizing security conditions in the affected areas, the attacks are set to complicate efforts to reach a permanent solution to the situation in the northeast. The associated negotiations will remain focused on efforts to integrate the SDF into a unified command structure within the new Ministry of Defense, and simultaneous Turkish-backed efforts to disarm the SDF.

This week, the SDF reiterated that negotiations involving Western elements – including the international coalition, the US, and France – continue as various sources suggest that a negotiated settlement could be reached in the coming months. According to a report by Reuters this week, one proposed settlement would involve some (likely YPG/PKK affiliated) elements leaving northeastern Syria while some elements are integrated with the new Ministry of Defence, yet the same source stated that several issues remain before any agreement can be reached. This includes the question of the US’ future presence in Syria and associated support for the SDF which remains in question in light of the presidential transition in Washington.

CENTCOM confirms death of leader of dissolved AQ group

In a related development this week, the US CENTCOM confirmed that US forces conducted a precision strike in northwest Syria’s Idlib province that resulted in the death of Muhammad Salah al-Za’bir, a senior operative within Hurras al-Din, an Al-Qaeda-linked group. Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, commander of CENTCOM, stated, “CENTCOM will continue to hunt down and either kill or capture terrorists to protect our homeland from groups that plot to attack US and allied personnel.” Local reports later claimed that the airstrike occurred near the town of Batbu, south of Sarmada in Idlib

The timing of the strike was noteworthy as it occurred a day after Hurras al-Din announced its decision to dissolve and cease operations in Syria in light of recent developments. In a statement attributed to its leadership and issued on 28 January, the group said: “In light of these developments on the Levantine scene, and by an Emiri decision from the General Command of al-Qaeda, we announce to our Muslim nation and to the Sunnis in the Levant the dissolution of the organization of Guardians of Religion, a branch of al-Qaeda in Syria.” The organization further confirmed that it remains ready “for any call for support and assistance in any part of the Muslim lands (…) and we will maintain our religious constants without change, alteration, or dilution.”

The group’s influence and activities in Syria have visibly declined in recent years as a result of a successful leadership decapitation campaign waged by the international coalition, internal friction and pressure from more moderate Islamist groups, including the HTS, that have weakened more extreme elements. That said, the death of al-Za’bir may prompt calls and attempts of retaliation against US forces and Western targets more broadly.

Speculation over US troop presence amidst withdrawal reports

The strike also came amidst continued speculation over the future US troop presence, with reports this week suggesting that President Trump informed Israeli counterparts that the US is planning a major troop withdrawal from Syria. The same report, originally published by the Israeli public broadcasting channel Kan, said “senior White House officials conveyed a message to their Israeli counterparts indicating that President Trump intends to pull thousands of US troops from Syria.” In response, Israeli leaders reportedly expressed concerns over the possible implications of the redeployment, with separate reports suggesting efforts by Tel Aviv to discourage the move.  Commenting on the reports late in the week, President Trump denied the claims yet said a decision on Syria will be made in the near future. The president did seem to express a reluctance to be involved however by declaring Syria to be “ its own mess” and that they “don’t need us involved.”

Beyond the remarks, the Trump administration has yet to make any formal announcements regarding troop levels in Syria or Iraq, with the reports this week plausibly attributed to deliberate leaks made to gauge public and allied reactions before any official announcement. Aside from the impact on the SDF-SNA conflict and, by extension, Turkey’s influence in the north, a decision on troop withdrawals would understandably have significant implications on counter-terrorism operations across the country, and in particular eastern Syria where IS elements continue to operate with a high level of operational freedom.