An escalation in Israeli-Palestinian tensions this month predictably prompted various levels of condemnation from stakeholders across the region. While Turkish government reactions were remarkably balanced when compared to previous rhetoric, the UAE and Bahrain issued unusually strong statements in response. While a source of contention and sensitivities, the Palestine issue is unlikely to affect strategic relations moving forward, but an escalation in violence would understandably test existing rapprochement efforts.
As widely reported in recent weeks, clashes outside the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem beginning earlier this month culminated on 22 April when Israeli security forces stormed the site to confront Palestinian protesters before Friday prayers. Dozens of individuals were reportedly injured according to Palestinian medical sources following clashes that lasted for several hours. As usual, both sides offer conflicting accounts of the scope and root cause of the latest violence.
Thus far, wider regional repercussions have been limited beyond rhetoric, yet the renewal of violence understandably raises concerns of heightened hostile sentiments given existing religious and cultural sensitivities, especially during the month of Ramadan. The clashes also raise concerns about an escalation in violence, similar to the conflict in May 2021. As of 27 April, a similar escalation has not materialized, but on 22 April Hamas launched two rockets into Israeli territory, with one impacting an empty area in southern Israel and the other in Gaza, injuring two residents. Israeli security forces also conducted a series of security operations inside the West Bank, in response to multiple terrorist attacks recorded across Israel during Ramadan. On 25 April, a rocket was launched from southern Lebanon into Israeli territory, with Israeli ground forces conducting cross-border strikes in response. Israeli military officials said the rocket attack was conducted by Palestinian groups operating in southern Lebanon and described the operations as a “routine measure,” in an assessed effort to downplay its significance.
Turkey strikes balanced tone amidst normalization process
Regional reactions to the violence have been predominantly rhetorical but worth noting as a challenge to recent steps by Israel and other regional stakeholders to improve ties despite the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. This includes steps taken by Turkey and Israel to re-establish relations following years of deteriorating ties rooted in deep-seated disagreements over the Israeli-Palestinian issue. To recall, Turkey cut ambassadorial relations in response to Israel’s decision to proclaim Jerusalem as its capital in 2020 and President Erdogan’s criticism of Israeli policies has been marked by strong rhetoric, including accusations of genocide.
Turkish government reactions to the latest round of violence were remarkably balanced by comparison. In a phone call with Israeli counterpart Isaac Herzog on 19 April, Erdogan said he was “saddened by the undesired scenes outside al-Aqsa” and deplored the killing and wounding of Palestinians outside the Mosque and on the West Bank. Speaking to members of his party the next day, Erdogan stressed that the tensions would not affect relations with Israel, emphasizing that a “relationship with Israel” is the way to “effectively defend the Palestinian cause.”
The remarks underscore Turkey’s intent to pursue further economic and political cooperation with Israel and to compartmentalize Israeli-Palestinian tensions independent of mutual strategic interests. As previously discussed in this report, this notably follows signs of enhanced energy cooperation between the two sides, including plans to import natural gas from Israeli offshore gas fields alongside the UAE, with a long-term intent to capitalize on shifting European demand in light of the Ukraine invasion. As discussed in connection with the ballistic missile strike targeting Erbil on 13 March, growing Turkey-Israel cooperation remains a potential driver of Iranian hostilities, and while Israeli-Palestinian tensions pose an understandable challenge, Turkish reactions this week underscore Ankara’s intent to pursue this relationship.
UAE and Bahrain condemn violence, but ties expected to remain unchanged
The violence during Ramadan is also set to challenge Israeli relations with the Gulf states, including Bahrain and the UAE which have been reluctant to criticize Israel since normalizing ties in 2020. In a noteworthy expectation, the foreign ministries of both countries issued separate statements to denounce the recent events. Bahrain called the activities of the Israeli police a “provocation to all Muslims” while the UAE stressed the need for self-restraint and protection of worshippers. On 19 April, UAE state media also reported that the Israeli Ambassador was summoned by the Foreign Ministry in Abu Dhabi to protest “recent attacks on civilians and incursions into the holy places.”
Reactions from other GCC states who have not normalized ties with Israel were predictably more critical, with strong statements of condemnation issued by Qatar, Oman and Kuwait over the week. Saudi Arabia – which like other GCC partners conditions normalization on the creation of a two-state solution but maintains a tacit security partnership with Israel – likewise criticized Israeli activities in a strongly worded statement on 15 April. In a sign of joint opposition, the GCC also released a joint statement to condemn the “storming” of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
These statements aside, Israeli-Palestinian tensions remain a source of internal GCC tensions, which are understandably set to intensify should the violence escalate further. Like the previous year, prominent Saudi commentators and media outlets blamed the recent violence in part on the UAE and Bahraini decisions to normalize ties with Israel, while Qatar and Oman remain strongly critical of the Abraham Accords. Since normalizing ties in 2020, overt criticism from the UAE and Bahrain towards Israel has been rare, and the statements released are noteworthy, though likely intended to rebuke criticism that these states are ignoring the Palestinian issue. The joint statement issued this week by the GCC is accordingly assessed as an attempt to forge a perception of unity amidst standing disagreements over the normalization issue which understandably remains sensitive.
Rhetoric aside, the current trajectory of Israeli-UAE/Bahraini relations is expected to continue, and absent a significant escalation in violence to the point relations become untenable, the conflict is unlikely to alter the further integration of ties. More likely, both sides will seek to compartmentalize areas of disagreement so as not to affect areas of mutual interest, with occasional statements issued to demonstrate solidarity. As in the previous year, the UAE may also adopt the position as a mediator in the conflict in the event of escalation, and extend its soft power in the region. For their part, Saudi Arabia continues to deny the existence of any plans for normalization, but as illustrated by the participation in joint military exercises earlier this year, tacit security and strategic cooperation with Israel is expected to continue despite disagreements on Palestine.
Like the Israeli-Turkey rapprochement, this broadly illustrates that the ideological and religious consideration underpinning solidarity with Palestine will likely remain subordinate to economic and strategic interests, which remains the driving factor behind the Israeli-Gulf rapprochement. An escalation in violence would undeniably test these relations moving forward, as Turkey, Bahrain and the UAE remain wary of domestic criticism and popular reactions that may complicate further integration.