Executive Summary

• Various reports allege a withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria to Ukraine, with Iranian-backed factions reportedly filling the void left by the withdrawal. Multiple reports simultaneously noted an increase in Iranian asset transfers in Aleppo and Deir Ez Zour provinces, coinciding with the purported Russian transfer.

• While plausible, the repositioning of assets remains subject to conflicting and politicized reporting, and details remain limited. Any link to the war in Ukraine remains tenuous, but the reported transfer of Russian forces and expansion of Iranian presence in Syria constitute long-term and potentially destabilizing indicators that are worth monitoring

• The possibility of Iran taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine to extend its presence is certainly not implausible given Russia’s established role in counter-balancing Iranian influence in recent years.

• The entrenchment of Iranian elements in Syria may incentivize an increase in Israeli operations against Iran-linked targets in the country, highlighted in recent weeks by the renewed targeting of Iranian-linked assets in Deir Ez Zour and Quneitrah.

Various reports of Russian redeployments to support Ukraine

According to a report released this week by the Moscow Times – an independent newspaper based in Amsterdam that is frequently critical of the Russian government – Russia commenced the process of withdrawing troops from Syria to support the war in Ukraine. As a result, Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn from several bases across the country in recent weeks and are now concentrated at three unnamed bases in the country. Citing its own sources, the report adds that Iranian-backed groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah and IRGC-linked militia factions, have now assumed control over these locations to fill the void left by the departure of Russian forces.

Further details were not provided, and details were vague, however reports circulating in opposition-linked media have similarly noted a redeployment of Russian assets to the Hemnin military base in Latakia; the T4 base in Homs governate; and Qamishli airport in Hasakah over previous months. The same sources similarly note a simultaneous deployment of predominantly Iran-linked assets to bases and locations previously occupied by Russian forces, including the Palmyra (Homs), Tabqa (Raqqa) and Nairab airports (Aleppo). This includes reports in March that various IRGC-linked factions assumed complete control over the Najrab airport, Aleppo Governate, where various forces aligned with Harakat al-Nujaba, Liwa al-Quds, and Fatimiyoun Brigades have reportedly increased their presence in previous months. In early April, various reports likewise claimed the Russian-backed Fifth Corps of the Syrian Army ceded control over the Mahim military depot in eastern Homes – a site containing more than 25 military warehouses and storage facilities – as well as Palmyra Airport in eastern Homs. As of mid-April, both sites were reportedly controlled by the Syrian Army Fourth Division, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Fatimiyoun Brigades.

According to local media reports predominantly affiliated with the Syrian opposition, these developments coincide with a general increase in Iranian-linked presence in the Aleppo and Deir Ez Zour governates, potentially linked to the Russian redeployment. In late April, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented a substantial shipment of military equipment across the Iraqi border, and earlier that month local reports indicated the arrival of trucks carrying components of medium-range missiles, ammunition and other weapons in the Shibli area and the Mayadin countryside in eastern Deir Ez Zour. Other sources, citing local security officials affiliated with opposition groups, noted a similar entrenchment of Iranian presence in the Aleppo countryside, where residents have been forced to evacuate premises now occupied by Iranian-aligned militia members.

Perceptions of Iranian-Syrian cooperation set to increase Israeli concerns

As usual, the veracity of the reporting is difficult to establish given the highly politicized nature of reporting from both state-linked and opposition-affiliated sources. Details of the alleged Russian withdrawals remain limited and are likewise shaped by competing narratives surrounding the Ukraine war. Channels critical of the Russian government frame the alleged withdrawals as evidence of Russian desperation, and – more questionably – as an impending collapse of Moscow’s footprint in Syria. Given the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, and the relative current stability of Syrian-government-controlled areas, a redeployment of combat-experienced troops between the two theaters is certainly not implausible. The appointment of General Alexander Dvornikov – who previously led operations in Syria – as commander of the Ukrainian front in April forms another plausible factor behind the alleged transfer.

That said, recent developments are not unprecedented, and some predate the war in Ukraine. Reports of Russian withdrawals from Najrab airport similarly circulated in October 2021, with opposition-linked media at the time claiming the airport was under the “complete control” of Iranian-backed factions. In 2019, Russia and the IRGC’s Quds Force were reported to have reached an agreement to transfer Iranian assets to the airport, which has since acted as a hub for Iranian activities in the surrounding area. Moreover, according to local sources, the recent redeployments may be in part motivated by local counter-terrorism considerations in light of a recent increase in IS activity in eastern Homs and Deir Ez Zour, where Iranian, Syrian Government and Russian forces are intensifying operations against IS.  This may offer an alternative and less drastic explanation for the concentration of forces at the T4 base.

Regardless, the war in Ukraine and continued Iranian expansion in Syria both constitute long-term and potentially destabilizing indicators that are worth monitoring. The possibility of Iran taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine to extend its presence is certainly not implausible given Russia’s established role in counter-balancing Iranian influence in recent years. This may incentivize an increase in Israeli operations against Iran-linked targets in the country, highlighted in recent weeks by the renewed targeting of Iranian-linked assets in Deir Ez Zour and Quneitrah.

Despite deepening levels of strategic cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, Russia has maintained deconfliction mechanisms with Israel and the presence of Russian forces has acted in part to disincentivize Israeli attacks against certain locations. The repositionings may therefore offer Israel greater operational freedom in terms of targeting Iranian assets. While official Israeli rhetoric has been limited, several Israeli media reports noted the reported Russian withdrawal as an object of concern.

Perceptions of growing Syrian-Iranian cooperation were further corroborated by President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Tehran this week and the symbolically significant meeting with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Details were characteristically vague, but the two sides pledged to enhance strategic cooperation and the timing of the rare visit, coinciding with the reported Russian withdrawal, strengthens perceptions of Syrian intent to deepen its dependency on Iranian support over the short to medium term. This would understandably pave the way for an enhanced Iranian footprint in the country while consolidating strategic cooperation between Russia, Syria, and Iran to counter western/US influence – a development likely to be intensified by existing NATO-Russian tensions. The movement of Russian forces in Syria will accordingly be followed closely over the near term, especially in so far as their presence may be affected by the war in Ukraine and result in shifts in Iranian force postures in Syria.